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*

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant IHC has not disputed any of the facts set forth in Plaintiff s principal
brief. The court should, therefore, deem all of Plaintiff s facts admitted for purposes of its
de novo review of IHC's motion for summary judgment. Also, on review of summary
judgment, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^[6, 177
P.3d600.
Furthermore, the court should disregard the facts narrated by IHC in its brief.
These "facts" are only supported by sporadic citation to the record, in violation of Rule
24(a)(7), Utah R. App. P., are often exaggerated or inaccurate, and, most importantly, are
irrelevant to the issues on appeal. In a "nutshell", IHC provides a narration about Dr. Witte's
care and treatment of Plaintiff s son. IHC's conduct in using an experimental ventilator on
Plaintiffs son, not Dr. Witte's medical care, is at issue on appeal.

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IHC'S BRIEF FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Defendant IHC fails to address the issues before the court on appeal At issue
are not Dr. Witte's desire to obtain a CT scan for Derek Nguyen, nor whether Dr. Witte's
duty of informed consent for her treatment should be shared by IHC.1 Rather, the issues are
whether IHC had a duty to obtain informed consent for its own conduct in testing a salesdemo ventilator on Plaintiffs son, and whether the Utah Court of Appeals contemplated this
issue in ruling that IHC was subject to liability for failing to obtain informed consent.
Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App 85,ffl[ 16-18, 232 P.3d 529, 532 (Utah
App. 2010) (hereinafter "Nguyen I"). Plaintiffs claim, as explicitly articulated by this Court
in its previous opinion, is that IHC failed in its duty to inform Mr. Nguyen that its sales-demo
ventilator "was unproven and was being tested by the hospital to determine if it should be
purchased [J...

that the ventilator was in the hospital on a trial basis for experimental

purposes; that it was still under evaluation; that it was actually intended for "life flight"
transport; and, most importantly, that the ventilator had not once been used on a patient"
Id., ffll 17, 18. (emphasis added).

*For example, IHC begins its argument, "PCMC does not have a duty to obtain
informed consent for medical procedures and treatment ordered by Dr. Witter p. 11.
(emphasis added).
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IHC ignores the language and ruling of this Court in Nguyen /, in favor of mischaracterizing the case as one over a duty to obtain informed consent for Dr. Witte's care.
To this end, IHC resurrects arguments explicitly rejected in Nguyen L For example, IHC
repeatedly states that Dr. Witte discussed with Mr. Nguyen the need and risk of transporting
Derek to get a CT scan. See e.g., Defendant's brief, pp. 7,12. In Nguyen /, the court noted
this assertion by IHC, and responded:
We note that the record shows that some general information was given
to Nguyen about the need for Derek to be transported to receive a CT
scan and "that there was a risk involved with this process." However,
it appears even from Defendants9 account that no information was
given to Nguyen regarding thefact that the ventilator was not regular
hospital equipment and that it was being tested by PCMC so it could
evaluate whether the ventilator should be purchased.
Nguyen /, at 537, n. 9. IHC's attempt to conceal its conduct in using the experimental
ventilator and, instead, make the case about Dr. Wite's decision to get a CT scan, was already
rejected by this Court. As explained by this Court, the issue is not what Dr. Witte told
Plaintiff about transport, the issue is what IHC failed to tell Plaintiff before attaching its
sales-demo ventilator to his son.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT AND IHC HAVE FAILED TO ABIDE THE
MANDATE OF NGUYEN.
IHC's arguments only emphasize the reason for and the importance of the
mandate rule of the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine exists to "avoid
the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings

-3-
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on matters previously decided in the same case." See, Thurston v. Box Elder County
{^'Thurston IF), 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). Yet, here we are again, addressing the
same attempt by IHC to misconstrue the nature of Plaintiff s informed consent claim, which
attempt was previously heard and rejected by this Court. IHC refuses to acknowledge that
it made all the same arguments, including its argument that it had no duty to obtain informed
consent, when the parties were previously before the court of appeals between 2008 and
2010. See, Addendum 2, R. 3742-3746, pp. 28-31; Addendum 3, R. 3748-3753, pp. 10-14,
attached to Plaintiffs Principal Brief. This is a large waste of time and judicial and litigant
resources.
Had IHC believed that this Court ignored its argument, as explained by the
Supreme Court in Thurston II, its opportunity and obligation was to ask the court for
rehearing, not to wait for a more favorable venue with the trial court, where the claim had
before been dismissed. See, Thurston II, at 1037-38. IHC's duty to obtain informed consent
was argued and briefed for this Court, and this Court ruled that IHC was subject to liability.
See, Nguyen I, fflf 16-18; Addendum 2, R. 3742-3746, pp. 28-31; Addendum 3, R. 37483753, pp. 10-14. Even though the decision in Thurston /was arguably wrong2, in Thurston
II, the court stated, "The county did not petition for rehearing of Thurston I. The County was
thus bound by the decision of Thurston I on remand of this case in all further proceedings

2

The supreme court recognized that "Thurston /overstated the applicability of the Act
to the County's personnel policies and procedures," but declined to reconsider its ruling, for
reasons of efficiency and consistency. Thurston II, at 1038-39.

-4-
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below." Id. at 1037-38. Likewise, because it failed to petition the court of appeals for
rehearing, IHC is bound by the decision in Nguyen I in all subsequent proceedings.
Nevertheless, IHC continues misappropriating language from Nguyen I that the
trial court's " 'sole rationale . . . for granting summary judgment was the absence of expert
testimony.' " See, Addendum 1, p. 2, f 2, attached to Plaintiffs Principal Brief. IHC will
not acknowledge the obvious, that the trial court's sole rationale for dismissal does not
equate to a sole consideration by the Utah Court of Appeals. IHC argued that it owed no
duty to obtain informed consent and the court rejected that argument in holding IHC subject
to liability. In fact, as noted above, this Court's opinion specifically addressed the argument
that Dr. Witte alone owed a duty and fulfilled that duty by telling Plaintiff about a general
risk of transport. The court held that there was more to the case, that IHC's failure to
disclose the experimental status of the sales-demo ventilator, as well as the trial court's
rationale that expert testimony was required, were the grounds for holding IHC subject to
liability for failing to obtain informed consent:
Because there was a total absence of any disclosure about the ventilator's
experimental status and because the court's sole rationale given for granting
summary judgment was the absence of expert testimony, we reverse the grant
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the claim of failure to
obtain informed consent. On that claim, we remand for trial or such other
disposition as may now be proper.
Nguyen /, f 18 (emphasis added).
IHC misplaces reliance on Madsen v. Washington Mut Bank FSB, 2008 UT
69,199 P.3d 898. There, the defendant did not argue on the first appeal that federal banking

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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regulations were grounds for summary judgment. Id. at f 7. This was raised only on the
second appeal; therefore, the supreme court rightly held that the law of the case did not
preclude raising the issue in the second appeal. Id. at f 26. Contrast Madsen with the case
at bar, where IHC did argue and brief the issue of its duty to obtain informed consent on the
first appeal. See, Addendum 2, R. 3742-3746, pp. 28-31; Addendum 3, R. 3748-3753, pp.
10-14. Thus, Madsen supports application of the law of the case doctrine to the matter at bar;
that is, where the law of the case does not apply to a position not previously asserted, as in
Madsen, it does apply to a matter previously argued on appeal, as it was in the case at bar.
Therefore, as stated peviously, IHC's only remedy was to petition for rehearing, not seek
reversal of this Court's ruling at the trial court level. The trial court, too, should have
honored the mandate of Nguyen I, and stricken the motion for summary judgment.
POINT III
IHC OWED A DUTY TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT FOR
ITS OWN CONDUCT.
As noted above, rather than address its duty to obtain informed consent for its
own conduct, IHC's brief sets up the same "straw man" argument previously rejected in
Nguyen /, to wit, that Plaintiffs claim is for Dr. Witte's failure to obtain informed consent
to transport Derek for a CT scan. Thus, IHC incorrectly asserts that at issue is whether a
hospital owes a "concurrent" duty with an attending physician to obtain informed consent for
care provided by that physician in its hospital. IHC then sets forth lengthy, irrelevant
arguments, and cites numerous inapposite cases, to the effect that IHC should not owe a
-6-
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"concurrent" duty with Dr. Witte for her care and treatment, since that would interfere with
the doctor-patient relationship. Sure, in those situations where a hospital's conduct is not at
issue, the majority rule is, and rightly is, that the hospital owes no duty of care to a patient.
However, that is not this case.
Again, as recognized by Nguyen /, at issue is IHC's duty in regard to its own
conduct.3 As set forth in the undisputed Statement of Facts of Plaintiff s Principal Brief,
IHC, not Dr. Witte, was in the process of obtaining, testing, and evaluating ventilators for
its life flight services. IHC, not Dr. Witte, set up the parameters for experimenting with those
ventilators, including that they not be used on critically-ill nor unstable patients. IHC, not
Dr. Witte, had the responsibility of determining reliability of the sales-demo ventilators by
experimenting within the parameters established by IHC. IHC, not Dr. Witte, received the
subject sales-demo ventilator into the hospital. IHC' s employees then made the decision to
use that sales-demo ventilator contrary to IHC' s established parameters, after it appeared that
its testing could not proceed as planned with moderately ill, stable patients.
While it is true that Dr. Witte was a member of IHC's committee charged with
testing, evaluating, and acquiring a life-flight ventilator, she was not chair of the committee,
nor did she, nor could she act in her individual capacity to use the sales-demo on Derek. The
chair of IHC's committee authorized use of the sales-demo on Derek Nguyen. An IHC

3

Utah Courts have always held that entities have a duty for their own conduct. See,
e.g.,Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, f|[ 37-38; Ottens v. McNeil 2010 UT App
237, <[27.

-7-
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employee on the committee then attached Derek to the sales demo. IHC employees who
were IHC committee members, along with the sales-man, watched the use of the sales demo
on Derek. IHC's duty arises from its own conduct.
IHC mis-characterizes Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
as construing Utah Code Section 78B-3-406 to place a duty of informed consent only upon
a physician. Lounsbury did not address the issue of whether Utah Code §78B-3-406 places
a legal duty of informed consent upon a hospital. The answer to that question is contained
in the plain language of Utah Code §§78B-3-403(12) and 78B-3-406. Utah Code §78B-3406 imposes a duty of informed consent upon a "Health care provider". Utah Code §78B-3403(12) defines "Health care provider" as follows:
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership,
association, corporation, or otherfacility or institution who causes to
be rendered or who renders health care or professional services as a
hospital, health care facility... and officers, employees, or agents of
any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment
Utah Code §78B-3-403(12) (emphasis added). IHC and PCMC are health care providers for
purposes of Utah Code §§78B-3-403(12) and 78B-3-406. Thus, by its plain language, the
Utah Code establishes that IHC Health Services Inc., dba Primary Children's Medical Center,
is a health care provider that owes a legal duty of care to obtain informed consent for health
care or professional services it renders or causes to be rendered in its facility, including that
rendered or caused to be rendered by IHC's officers, employees, or agents.
As set forth above, and recognized by the court in Nguyen /, IHC, through its
officers, employees, and agents rendered health care and professional services, albeit
-8-
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improper care and services, to Plaintiffs son. It, therefore, owed a duty to obtain informed
consent. To hold that IHC does not owe a duty of informed consent for its own conduct,
would mean that hospitals could ( as IHC did here), subject their patients to experimental
procedures and devices without informing parents and obtaining their permission.
To the extent that Dr. Witte was also involved in the decision to use the salesdemo ventilator on Derek Nguyen, she too was acting as IHC's officer, employee, and/or
agent. IHC states that Dr. Witte was not its employee and that it is not vicariously subject
to liability for her conduct. Yet, as presented to the trial court (and to the court of appeals
on the first appeal), and set forth again in Plaintiffs principal brief, Dr. Witte was IHC's
Medical Director of Pediatric Life-Flight, the department for which she and IHC's other
employees were testing and evaluating the sales-demo ventilator. IHC paid Dr. Witte
$20,000 per year in this position. Plaintiffs Principal Brief, Statement of Facts, ^ 14. Dr.
Witte was a member of IHC's CTM committee charged with testing and evaluating the salesdemo. The committee tasked Dr. Witte with drawing up the informed consent release for
parental signature. Thus, even if one assumed that no one but Dr. Witte was involved in
attaching Derek to the sales-demo ventilator, IHC would still owe a duty of informed
consent, since the evidence shows that Dr. Witte was IHC's officer, employee, and/or agent
in regard to use of the sales-demo ventilator. However, given the extensive evidence of the
conduct of IHC's other officers and employees, as recognized in Nguyen /, one need not
consider Dr. Witte.

-9-
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POINT IV
IHC ALSO ASSUMED A LEGAL DUTY TO OBTAIN
INFORMED CONSENT.
IHC knew that it had no right to subject Derek Nguyen or other children, even
medically-stable children, to experimental devices, and concluded that it must obtain parental
informed-consent before attaching children to the sales-demo ventilators. IHCs CTM
committee assigned committee-member Dr. Witte the job of drafting the informed consent
document. IHCs assumption of legal duty, in this regard, complied with the representations
it made to parents in the "Patient Bill of Rights" that it posted at Primary Children's Medical
Center:
Primary Children's Medical Center is dedicated to meeting your health
care needs, and to treating you and your child with the respect and
consideration you deserve.
You and your child have the following rights:

•

To participate in your child's plan of care and other
decisions about your child9s health care, including how
to manage your chiWs plan.

•

To be told ifanyproposedtreatmentis forthe purpose
of research, and to be able to consent or refuse to
participate without your decision affecting your child's
care.

•

To be informed of hospital rules that apply to you and
your child.

R. 3847-3848. (emphasis added).
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Like other issues on appeal, IHC's brief ignores whether IHC assumed a legal
duty to obtain Plaintiffs informed consent. IHC fails to contest the holdings of other
jurisdictions finding hospital assumption of legal duty in similar circumstances, including,
Lenahan v. University of Chicago, 808 N.E.2d 1078,1082 - 85 (111. App. 5th 2004); Friter v.
Iolab Corp.,607 A2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Campbellv. Pitt County Mem. Hosp., Inc.,
352 S.E.2d903 (N.C. App. 1987); fe v. Sherman Hosp., 644N.E.2d 1214 (Ill.App. 1995);
Stewart v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 736 N.E.2d 491, 501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); and
Watkins v. Hosp. of the University ofPenn., 737 A.2d 263, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
The undisputed facts in this case are that IHC was conducting a clinical
evaluation of an experimental, sales-demo ventilator, and that the hospital rightly imposed
upon itself a requirement that informed consent be obtained for any child put on the salesdemo ventilator. Plaintiff Principal Brief, Statement of Facts, f 7. It is also undisputed that
IHC failed to obtain informed consent to comply with its own policies. Nguyen I at f 18
(stating that "there was a total absence of any disclosure about the ventilator's experimental
status . . . ." Id.) Considering these essential facts in light of the rules regarding a selfimposed obligation, IHC must take responsibility for failing to obtain informed consent for
the use of the experimental ventilator.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to follow the law of the case in reversing the Utah Court
of Appeals decision in Nguyen L This Court should now enforce its mandate from Nguyen
/, reversing the trial court's second entry of summary judgment. The Utah Code, quoted in
Nguyen /, imposed a legal duty on IHC to obtain parental consent in using the experimental
sales-demo ventilator on Plaintiffs son. Also, IHC assumed a legal duty of care by rightly
imposing upon itself the obligation to obtain informed consent.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals
again reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court and remand the case for trial.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 8TH day of December, 2011.

Matthew H. Raty
(j
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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